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THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE

Introduction

The association of two or more great nations in an agreement to furnish each other assistance creates a power which may be used for a variety of purposes as it passes through the control of different individuals and political groups. As the Delian League became an Athenian empire, as the Holy Alliance of Alexander I was utilized to attain the reactionary objects of Metternich, so history abounds in examples which would seem to demonstrate the wisdom of judging international combinations by their possible tendencies as well as by their original purposes. The Dual Alliance was a combination so recent and of such power in the modern world that a study of the stages through which it developed should be of some value.

Like the Oaths of Strassburg, taken a thousand and fifty years earlier, the alliance was a union of east and west against the center. In considering the immediate causes of its formation the greater amount of thought must be given the Russian side of the case as the reasons impelling France to take the step are more clearly apparent.

As for France, twenty years after Sedan Russia would seem to present the only conceivable opportunity for an alliance. Austria had long been in the enemy's camp where Italy, alienated from France by the seizure of Tunis, had followed. England was an ancient foe still bound by tradition and by dynastic ties to

Germany. The English government, moreover, was responsible to a public opinion opposed to strong international commitments and, among the great nations, France had lately been peculiarly adventurous and unsuccessful. Between France and England there was still the Egyptian question and in most cases England could hardly be expected, as an ally of France, to possess the advantages presented by a continental power with compulsory military training.

What had Russia to offer? Russia's war strength in the early years of the French Republic might be difficult to estimate owing to the vastness of the empire and uncertainties regarding organization and morale, but in any case the country had an enormous population and employed, theoretically at least, the system of universal service.¹ As for the material facilities of war, financial assistance could greatly improve them. It should be remembered that the test of strength with Japan did not occur until a decade after the Dual Alliance had passed through its formative stages. Russia had conducted her war with Turkey (1877-8) rather successfully as was evidenced by the Treaty of San Stefano. The Treaty of Berlin proved the extent of Russia's diplomatic defeat but it did not represent a military defeat. Of course from

¹In regard to Russian defenses, it is interesting to note a remark from Witte. Referring to the generation preceding the Russo-Japanese war he said, "For thirty years we were building railroads with a view to war in the west." Memoirs of Count Witte, p. 75.

the French point of view, the preponderant advantage of Russia lay in her location. The security of her eastern frontier naturally played a most important part in the foreign policy of France. An ally capable of diverting a large number of German troops eastward would surely be an ally worth having. Against the Russian combination--if we consider only the aims commonly attributed to diplomacy, there is not much to be said from the French point of view except to note the dangers of committing France to Far- or Near-Eastern adventures of Russia, of antagonizing the Triple Alliance, of driving England in the direction of Germany, and of sometime having to cooperate in an uncertain war against all the powers of the Triple Alliance, enlarged. It might be inquired if, after all, French security could not best be attained by a thorough-going "rapprochement" with Germany. In considering this question it should be remembered that French ministers can hold office only while they are good politicians. In any case, a "rapprochement" between Germany and France could not be very deep or genuine so long as the former declined to alter the status quo in Alsace Lorraine and the latter declined to accept it.

As for Russia, her ambitions were in the Near East and were destined to become extensive in the Far East in but a few years. On the west her desire was for insurance against attack. If attacked by Germany Russia might be reasonably assured of French help even without incurring the obligations of an alliance. Why, then, should Alexander III with his apparent suspicions of French desires for "Revanche"¹ and his dislike of republican institutions assume such responsibilities? The reply is not immediately obvious but dis-

¹Langer in article on "Franco Russian Alliance" in Slavonic Review, June 1925.

closes itself as we trace the period of long and often uncertain negotiations which finally culminated in an alliance based upon secret agreements for military cooperation. Three factors in the situation, however, are preeminent among a large number of more or less determining influences. They are--first, the non-renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty; second, Russia's need of money and modern munitions; and third, the Tsar's anxiety concerning, ironically enough, something which did not exist--a British silent partnership in the Triple Alliance.¹

The obstacles to the alliance were numerous as a very brief glance at the situation will reveal. Russia could not be expected to forget the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean Campaign, or the French attitude toward Polish aspirations. Alexander thoroughly disapproved of the French politics. Russia had given no help to France in 1871 and had received no encouragement from her in 1878. All these facts weighed, if at all, against a bond of union. Then, in a country like Tsarist Russia in which the personal whim of the ruler might easily determine national policy, one cannot overlook entirely such irritations against the Russian regime as the Appert²

¹ Langor, Slavonic Review, March 1925, pg. 558-560.

² Korff, "Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century," P. 6.

and Floquet¹ incidents or the Hartman and Kropotkin matters.² Yet these considerations could hardly weigh in the scale permanently if obvious and vital interests were involved.

At the Congress of Berlin Russia had been defeated by Austria and England, the great opponents of her Balkan policy, and had apparently counted too much upon German friendship.³ Russia had been humiliated and, for the moment, quite isolated. This isolation was ended in 1881 by a kind of restoration of the Three Emperors' League which, in its revived form, lasted until 1887. The Reinsurance Treaty of that year kept Russia in "the Enemy's camp" from the French viewpoint until 1890.

¹Tardieu, "France and the Alliances", P. 5.

²Korff, op. cit., P. 7.

³Gooch, "History of Modern Europe", pp. 32-34.

Drafting the Text

The Diplomatic Record

The year 1890, when Germany declined to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, opened a new page in diplomatic groupings. The change was not abrupt or immediately certain but as we look upon it from the vantage point of later years the new direction is quite apparent. In spite of the historical obstacles mentioned, in the year 1890 the diplomatic balance sheet was favorable, on the whole, to a Franco-Russian understanding. The Tsar had befriended the republic in 1875 and in later years French statesmen had seized opportunities to ingratiate themselves with the imperial ruler. Laboulaye, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg had proved a capable diplomat.¹ In 1887 the authorities in Paris had given a cool reception to the Bulgarian delegates so out of favor with the Russian rulers and in 1890 they took advantage of another opportunity by adopting repressive measures against Russian revolutionaries.

The attempted reunion of the three continental empires had broken down in 1887. Russian antipathy toward Austria had reasserted itself and the Austro-German friendship was of course well known at St. Petersburg. If any improvement could have been made in Russo-German affairs after the dismissal of Bismarck (whom Alexander III did not like) the opportunity was more than lost by the non-renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty. Bismarck had always appreciated the danger of a Franco-Russian understanding and had conducted a

¹Korff, op. cit. pp. 9-10.

Near Eastern policy in full accord with that appreciation. The ~~new~~ new masters of German foreign policy were not prepared to go so far for Russia as he had gone. The uncertainty of the situation thus created, the possibility that Germany, - already allied with Austria, - might become allied with England, presented a question to which the Tsar felt compelled to make a reply. By the Cyprus convention¹ England would be compelled to answer a call from the Sultan to the Levant. If, facing England and Turkey in the south-east Russia might experience an Austro-German attack from the west, her fate would probably be sealed. A strong Western ally would be the only solution. Republican France, suspected of being actuated by aggressively anti-German proclivities, could not be an ally suited to the Tsar's tastes but Caprivi would put no assurances upon paper and the conclusion of the Heligoland Treaty² in 1890 aroused suspicions concerning Anglo-German relations.

At the same time France was making herself more acceptable as a potential ally. The reforms in her army, the fact that General Boisdeffre was a monarchist and the vigorous repressive measures now taken regarding Russian revolutionaries by the Paris police may very likely have contributed to make France

1. See Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. 1V, pp 2722, 2723. England had engaged to assist Turkey by force of arms in case Russia should attempt to seize any Turkish possessions in Asia.

2. Langer, Franco-Russian Alliance, Slavonic Review, March 1925. The Treaty was followed by the Kaiser's visit to England in the summer of 1890. Nine days after the treaty was signed the "Morning Post," a government organ, contained the comment that "The period of England's isolation is over."

appear as a more desirable friend from the Tsar's point of view.

While the diplomatic background was thus rather well prepared for action, the economic and military spheres were not less so. In 1888 and 1889 France made loans to Russia of such size as to suggest something more than business transactions. In 1889 the Russian order for five hundred thousand Lebel rifles was received only upon the assurance that they would never be used against Frenchmen.¹ The forces of economic and military pressure thus at work were increased during the formative period of the alliance by a Russo-German tariff war and the discussion of a new army bill in the Reichstag.

In 1891 events began to move more rapidly. The danger connected with the visit of the German Empress to Paris of course had the effect - as did the Schoebele incident² of an earlier date, of emphasizing the need of an alliance in some French minds. Then in June 1891, the renewal of the Triple Alliance was formally announced. The connection of this renewal in the minds of rulers with the Kaiser's sojourn in England and the visit of the British fleet to Fiume and Venice seemed to have produced a psychological state that demanded action. To the suspicious or anxious mind it could easily appear plausible that Great Britain, Germany, Austria, and Italy had secretly combined against France and Russia.

Russia, even apart from the fact that she was just then faced by famine, was seriously in need of money. Money in sufficient quantities could be obtained only in France³ and France would grant

1..... Freycinet, "Souvenirs" Vol. II pp 440-514.

2..... A border incident. A German official lured an overly zealous French official into Germany where he was arrested. When he realized that the man had come upon German invitation, Bismarck ordered his release.

3..... Gooch, ^{Hof M. G.} 164 The German Bourse was closed at the time to Russian loans.

a loan only upon the condition of an alliance¹. After the visit of the French fleet at Kronstadt and its extremely cordial reception in July, the world realized France and Russia had decided to draw together.

The original alliance going into force August 27, 1891, contained the following brief provisions:-²

- 1..... To define and consecrate the Entente Cordiale which unites them, the two governments declare that they will confer on every question of a nature to threaten peace.
- 2..... If peace is in danger, and especially if one of the two is menaced by aggressions, they agree to concert measures.

It should be noted that France had wished a much stronger agreement than that embodied in the formula submitted by Giers, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The French proposal for concerted action upon all questions affecting European peace and for simultaneous mobilization in case of mobilization by one member of the Triple Alliance contrasts strongly with the Giers plan which provided for only a general agreement that when they thought necessary the two powers should take counsel together regarding concerted measures. The two programs were finally so compromised as to produce the formula already given.

It is certain that the Russian motive in entering the Alliance was purely defensive. There is no proof of aggressive intent on the part of the French government although the French wished stronger terms than their allies would accept. But it would be absurd to think there were no responsible Frenchmen who hoped to use the Alliance for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. When in the

1..... See Korff "Russian Foreign Policy During Last Half Century" p..19

2..... Gooch ^{H. of M. 2.} p 174/

Chamber of Deputies in 1896 M. Millerand rhetorically asked what France was to receive in return for her obligations in the Dual Alliance, he replied that it was not necessary for France to resign herself to accepting a "fait accompli". Welshinger¹ relates that the remark produced a prolonged applause. Such incidents as this, together with the large amount of popular support which had lately (some years before) been accorded General Boulanger, may cause the historian to suspect the existence of large numbers of Frenchmen during the nineties who valued the Dual Alliance for purposes not wholly pacific. However, the alliance itself was a purely defensive instrument and no one responsible for its conclusion has been proved guilty of other motives.

The step taken by the two nations was significant in itself and its importance at once recognized by Europe in general and ^{by} England and Germany in particular. Caprivi dwelt upon it in the Reichstag as a reason for the new army bill. It was a demonstration of French recovery from disastrous defeat and proved the possibility of intimate relations between the most divergent regimes. The principle of monarchical solidarity which had been the main spring of Metternich's activities and which had persisted in the Three Emperors' League was never again to control European affairs. For the next quarter of a century European history was to be chiefly a series of struggles and a gradual shifting of the balance between two armed camps.

The Military Convention.

For two years after the signing of the treaty the French ministry made persistent efforts to supplement the political agreement by a military convention. It was natural that the

1..... Welshinger "L'Alliance Franco-Russe" pg. 18.

French should take this attitude during the presidency of Carnot and the ministries of Freycinet and Ribot. The first overtures to the Tsar appear to have been made by Jules Hansen¹, who was given scant encouragement. Then in the fall of 1891 the Russian foreign minister, Giers, visited Paris where he emphasized Russia's peaceable aims and declined to take part in any military arrangement on the grounds of personal incompetency and lack of authority. According to Poincare², however, he accepted the principle of military co-operation. Giers reported that in his talk with French ministers the words "Revanche" and "Alsace-Lorraine" had not been spoken.

During the winter of 1891-2 the time seemed opportune for the French purposes. The Kaiser and the Tsar were not upon speaking terms, and Germany had been unwilling to grant Russia a loan or conclude a satisfactory commercial agreement with her. Now France wanted an arrangement directed strongly against Germany while Austria was Russia's more natural enemy. It thus behooved France to act at the moment. Early in 1893, Montebello - the new French ambassador at St. Petersburg - presented suggestions for a military agreement prepared by the French Chief of Staff, General Mirabel.³ The draft contained an argument for making Germany, rather than Austria, the principal object of attack and demanded from each signatory definite commitments as to the proportion of its fighting forces which would be available against Germany. The unfavorable reception of this proposal led Montebello to suggest such changes as he deemed necessary.

French interest was sufficient to present a new draft to the Tsar early in March. This time Alexander definitely accepted

- 1..... A Gallicized Dane who was greatly interested in French politics. He wrote a book upon the Dual Alliance.
- 2..... Poincare' "Origins of the War" p. 52
- 3..... Laugor "Franco Russian Alliance" Slavonic Review June 1925.

the principle of military co-operation. A Russian plan was drafted by the minister of war, Vaunovskij, but no action was taken upon it for months. The interest of the French officials, meantime, was demonstrated by their impatience.¹

The two powers were finally brought together in a conference at which their experts discussed definite proposals. The French desired a binding agreement for

(1) immediate and simultaneous mobilization in case of mobilization by the Triple Alliance or by Germany alone,

(2) placing all Russia's forces upon the German frontier except those needed for defence against Austria,

(3) A Russian attack upon the German armies to prevent the transfer of German troops westward,

(4) Continuation of the pact during the existence of the Triple Alliance - and

(5) no separate peace.²

The Russians were hesitant. For the satisfaction of the Tsar the draft was so revised as to include a pledge of absolute secrecy and to make mobilization obligatory in the event of mobilization by the Triple Alliance or by "one of its members". Thus Russia would be obliged to act in case of mobilization by Germany and France would be obliged to act in case of mobilization by Austria. Still the Tsar would not act without the approval of Giers who was then too ill to consider the matter.

During the winter of 1892-3 the prospects of action seemed rather slight. While the prestige of France was suffering from the Panama scandal the Liberals were in power in England. The

1.....Langer "The Franco-Russian Alliance " Slav. Review 1925

2..... Ditto.

Gladstone ministry seemed to ease Russo-British tension on the one hand while it made an Anglo-German Alliance seem less natural on the other. The overtures made to the Tsarevich during his visit in Berlin appear to have made an impression but there was no visible result in his father's actions. In spite of the other signs the continuance of unfortunate tariff war between Germany and Russia and the final passage of a new German Army bill kept Russian foreign policy directed toward Paris. According to Langer¹, the French course in the Siamese crisis impressed the Tsar as a demonstration that France could and would oppose England in Asia.

Again the French were prompt to seize an opportunity. In response to Montebello's invitation a Russian squadron visited Toulon, creating a political sensation in more than one capital. From the view point of those seeking a military convention the visit left little to be desired and the moderation of the French press must have served to relieve the Tsar's anxiety about French designs. At the same time the appearance of a British squadron on the Italian coast could only raise the terrible spectre of British co-operation with the Triple Alliance. Finally, in December, 1893 Russia formally accepted the agreement signed a year earlier by her military chief.²

The convention opens with a paragraph affirming the peaceful intentions of its signatories. The body of the document is divided into seven articles, as follows:-

Article I states that if France is attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia will use all her available forces against Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, France will use all her forces against Germany.

1..... Slavonic Review, June 1925.

2..... Gooch p. 183.

Article II, dealing with mobilization, provides that if the Triple Alliance or one of its members shall begin to mobilize, France and Russia, upon receiving the news and without any immediate agreement, will mobilize (at once), sending their forces to the frontiers.

Article III states the minimum number of troops to be supplied each nation. The number of French troops to be available against Germany was fixed at 1,300,000 while the Russians were to supply for the same purpose from 7 to 800,000. It is expressly stated that the forces shall be so directed as to compel Germany to fight simultaneously upon eastern and western fronts.

Article IV deals with co-operative measures in time of peace. It is agreed that the military chiefs of the two powers shall act together, communicating to each other any information they may acquire concerning the preparations of the Triple Alliance. They shall also prepare a method of war correspondence.

Article V is a statement that neither nation shall make a separate peace. (The concluding phrase, "with the Triple Alliance" was suppressed in accordance with the French demand. It should be noted in articles I, III, and V how completely the French argument for making Germany the principal object of attack had been accepted by Russia.)

Article VI made the duration of the agreement the same as the duration of the Triple Alliance.

Article VII - the last article was a pledge of absolute secrecy.

The alliance was officially proclaimed by Premier Ribot in 1895 and by Nicholas II in 1897. It was thus made clear that the new Tsar intended to pursue the course of his father. The terms

were kept secret as was also the amendment added to the military convention in 1899.

~~Document~~ In a letter written to President Loubet before the addition of the amendment Delcasse', then French minister of Foreign Affairs, summarized the Franco-Russian Agreements as including a "general diplomatic accord" and a military convention which he termed "an instrument for the execution of that accord".¹ But the "accord" and its "instrument" might not be for the same duration as the former was to exist for an indefinite period, while the latter, according to its own terms, was to have the "same duration as the Triple Alliance." Delcasse' presented a plausible argument² for changing the situation. The Triple Alliance might come to an end by some cause other than the wish of all its members. One of its members, Austria Hungary, might cease to exist as a single power and thus, ipso facto, terminate the Triple Alliance. According to its own terms the military convention between France and Russia would automatically end with the end of the rival combination. Yet a disintegration of the Hapsburg empire might seriously disturb the peace of Europe and thus the Dual Alliance might cease to function at the precise moment for which it was intended. According to Delcasse', the Emperor Francis Joseph seemed to be "the only trace of union among rival and even hostile races"³ and as his death might occur at any time the argument was naturally impressive. Largely through his own efforts Delcasse' was enabled to see his ideas recognized and his aims embodied in the international contract. By an exchange of letters between the French and Russian Ministers

1..... Welshinger "L'Alliance Franco-Russe," Pg. 218-9

2..... Welshinger pg. 218

3..... ditto

of Foreign Affairs,¹ the Military convention was amended in July 1899, by the addition of the following clause:²

"The Governments, always bent on the maintenance of peace and equilibrium, between European forces, confirm the diplomatic arrangement formulated in August 1891. They decide that the project of the military convention of 1893 shall remain operative as long as the diplomatic accord."

In other words the entire agreement was to last as long as the two nations should be pleased to continue it.

The Naval Convention

It was not until 1912 that the military understanding was supplemented by a naval arrangement. But the negotiations in 1912 were much more expeditious than those of twenty years earlier and in the later instance the Russians took the initiative. Early in February 1912, Georges Louis, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg telegraphed the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raymond Poincare' in reference to an interview with the Russian Minister of the Navy in which the latter had declared the Tsar would "view with satisfaction" the establishment of a naval agreement similar to the military convention of 1892.³ On the same day in informing the French Minister of the Navy, Poincare' gave his personal endorsement of the idea. Delcasse' replied four days later, stating that he had ~~pr~~ previously been approached upon the subject by the Russian Naval Attache' and expressing his personal approval.

The actual terms of the proposed convention were discussed

1.....Delcasse' and Muraviev

2.....Gooch "History of Modern Europe" pg. 186.

3.....Welshinger pg. 221. An interesting suggestion regarding the attitude of Russian authorities toward the alliance in this period is furnished by one sentence in the telegrams, "The Admiral made this communication to me in very warm terms."

in Paris where they were drafted in their final form and were signed July 16th. They provided:-¹

In Article I, that the French and Russian Naval forces should cooperate in any eventuality to which the military convention would apply.

In Article II, that the arrangements for co-operation should be made in time of peace. To this end, the naval chiefs of staff of the two powers were authorized to "correspond directly, to exchange all information, to study all the hypotheses of war, and to plan together strategic programs".

In Article III, that the chiefs of staff should confer in person "at least once a year".

In Article IV, that the new agreement should be identical to the military convention in "duration, elaboration, and secrecy".

This convention was signed by the naval ministers and chiefs of staff of the two countries.² Upon the same day ^a supplementary agreement describing the methods of correspondence to be employed between Russian and French naval officers was drawn up and signed by Aubert and Prince Lieven.

In response to expressions of concern from Germany and Austria Hungary, Briand sent to the principal European capitals assurances to the effect that France remained attached to the "traditional principles of its policy, which is to say the maintenance of the European Equilibrium".³

An exchange of notes⁴ in the following month between M. Sazanoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Poincare¹ sealed the approval of the civil governments.

1..... Text in Welshinger... pg. 223.

2..... By Delcasse¹ (French Minister of the Navy), Aubert, (chief of staff of the French Navy) J. Grigorvitch (Russian Minister of the Navy) and Prince Lieven (Chief of staff of the Russian Navy).

3.... Welshinger pg. 226 gives the circular note in full.

THE FIRST DECADE.

During the years between the conclusion of the Dual Alliance and the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the activities of the new combination might be characterized as passive rather than active. In controversies between European powers France and Russia persistently placed themselves upon the same side, but in expansive activities they continued to pursue their respective policies quite independently and usually appeared to regard the Dual Alliance chiefly as a safeguard against aggression from Central Europe. M. Tardieu has characterized the period as one of "too many fetes" and "too many flowers." 1. Liberal advantage was certainly taken by both countries of opportunities to congratulate themselves upon their cordial relations. The visit of the Grand Duke Constantine to Nancy in 1892, the sojourn of the Tsar and Tsarina in France in 1896 and Delcasse's trip to Russia in 1899, were but a few of the many instances. The round of "courtesy visits" thus inaugurated was not without significance for, according to M. Poincare, it was in the keeping of this custom that he made his much discussed visit to ^{Russia} France in 1914. 2.

1. Tardieu. France and the alliances. p.11
2. Poincare. Origins of the war. p.59

But in one respect the cooperation was fruitful as well as apparent. Between 1893 and 1902 French capital enabled Russia to complete her railway program, to build the Trans Siberian, and to give great attention, generally, to Far Eastern affairs. 1. Of course, events were to show that in the last mentioned activity Russia was hardly benefiting herself. Tardieu 2. greatly reproaches France for not warning her ally emphatically of the dangers in extensive Asiatic adventures.

While Russian energies were being spent in Asia, French energies were being spent in Africa. Japan was soon to prove to be Russia's greatest rival, while England, whose rivalry with Russia was still keen, was France's greatest rival during the longer part of the period.

Russia became reconciled with Bulgaria 3. and "patched up" her quarrel with Austria, 4. while the Melidof plot for seizing the Straits 5. was not known to the world. On the whole friction between European powers concerned matters of world expansion much more than continental difficulties, and friction between the two alliances was comparatively slight. Indeed, during these years the grouping of powers was rather uncertain, as the

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|----|---------|--|
| 1. | Tardieu | p.11 |
| 2. | Tardieu | p.13 |
| 3. | Gooch | History of Modern Europe p.255 |
| 4. | Pribram | Secret Treaties of Austria Hungary. p. |
| 5. | Gooch. | p.257 |

position of England with its enormous world interests had not been determined. Until the advent of Delcasse the French Government does not seem to have fully decided whether to regard Germany or England as its especial rival. If Germany was to occupy that position, discretion would not permit antagonizing England and the reverse was equally true. In the Fashoda crisis Franco-British rivalry stopped only at war, and after the Sino Japanese War, Russia and France together cooperated with Germany to bring pressure upon the victor, while England (not yet in alliance with Japan) took no part.

In one respect these years were crowded with events destined to bear welcome fruit for the Dual Alliance. The two great combinations upon the European continent produced a state approaching equilibrium with such advantage as there was probably favoring the Triple Alliance. If ever the course of events should throw England into either family, the coalition thus increased would have the definite advantage. The decade following the formation of the Dual Alliance was the period of the unfortunate Cowes interview, the Kruger Telegram, the Tirpitz Naval Bill, the Bagdad Railway concessions and the German rejection of British offers of alliance. Thus we see the course of events which was shortly to bring about the Franco-British Entente.

During the years 1899-1902 a definite rapprochement was effected by France and Italy, between whom relations had been strained by events in Northern Africa. Thus began a series of

actions which was finally to cause diplomats to use such terms as, "repressive influence"¹ and "dead weight"² when speaking of Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance. The importance of such a situation to the rival combination is obvious.

In the opening years of the twentieth century both Russia and France made serious mistakes; the former by neglecting her opportunity to secure the good will of Japan, and both by their peculiar response to news of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Even after her leadership in revising the Treaty of Shimonoseki and after the development of her forward policy toward Korea, Russia appears to have had a good chance of securing Japanese friendship. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was not drafted until after Prince Ito's fruitless visit to Russia.³ That nation's refusal to regard Japan seriously as being in any sense a great power, paved the way for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and also for the Russo-Japanese War with its chain of disastrous consequences.

After the fact of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been made known to the world, the French and Russian Governments made the following official statement:⁴

"The allied governments of France and Russia, having received communication of the Anglo-Japanese Convention of the 30th of Janr

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|-------------|-----------------------------|-------|
| 1. Stieve.- | Isvolsky and the World War. | p.79 |
| 2. Stieve.- | op.cit. | p.91 |
| 3. Gooch.- | H. of M. & C. | p.331 |
| 4. Tardieu. | France and the Alliances. | p-19 |

uary, 1902, concluded with a view to assuring the status quo and general peace in the Far East, and to maintain the independence of China and Korea, which should remain open to the commerce and industry of all nations, were fully satisfied to find therein affirmed the essentials which they themselves have on several occasions declared to constitute and to remain the basis of their policy.

"The two governments deem that the respecting of these principles is at the same time a guarantee for their special interests in the Far East. However, being themselves obliged to provide for the case in which either the aggressive action of third powers, or new troubles in China, raising the question of the integrity and free development of this Power, should become a menace for their own interests, the two allied governments reserve to themselves the right eventually to provide means for their preservation."

A treaty of alliance between England and Japan did not call for a lengthy reply from France and Russia. If this pronouncement meant anything, it meant that the principles of the Dual Alliance were to apply in the Orient as well as in Europe. Even had France been fully prepared to carry out such a program an official declaration of the fact would be of doubtful wisdom, as Russian over-confidence might be encouraged. In the light of subsequent events the act can be regarded in one of only two ways—either it produced no effect at all, or it was most unfortunate.

THE PERIOD OF HUMILIATION.

Never in its history was the Dual Alliance nearer collapse than during the Russo-Japanese War. In that brief period three Russo-German treaties of defensive alliance were drafted. The first was intended to meet the situation created by British objection to the provisioning of Russian ships with coal by German vessels. It contained a pledge of reciprocal assistance in case of attack upon either member by a European power, a provision for joint pressure upon France if necessary to secure fulfillment of her obligations to Russia, a guarantee against separate peace, and a promise of support in case of post-war claims by a third power (obviously England) against one of the signatories "as to pretended violations" of neutrality rights.¹

A revised form also pledged Germany not to support any proposals for robbing Russia of the fruits of victory.¹ The Tsar's conviction that France should be informed before the treaty was signed and the Kaiser's emphatic disagreement seem to have been the principal factors which prevented signing at the time.

Later, Germany and Russia signed an agreement providing for German supply of coal to the Russian vessels and Russian sup-

¹. Gooch. *History of Modern Europe.* p.381-2

port of Germany if England should resort to war. 1.

The greatest purely diplomatic blow ever aimed at the Dual Alliance was the Bjorko Treaty. 2. It does not appear, like its predecessors, to have been a child of the Russo-Japanese War, but rather seems to have been the Kaiser's reply to the great rapprochement of France and England. The terms of the brief but remarkable instrument provided: 3.

1. If any European state shall attack either Power the other will aid with all its forces.
2. Neither will conclude a separate peace.
3. The treaty shall come into force on the conclusion of peace with Japan and may only be cancelled at a year's notice.
4. Russia will make its terms known to France and invite her to sign it as an ally.

The treaty was actually signed by the Tsar and Kaiser with witnesses. Could it have been approved by the Russian Ministers, could its principles be accepted by the allies of both Russia and Germany, and could its spirit have been observed by all, the two great alliances would have merged. The change might eventually result in the releasing of millions of men under arms for productive industries, while the diverse cultures of Europe would experience a new realization of security and prosperity. Like its rival, the Dual Alliance would cease to exist as a vital

1. Gooch p.383
 2. Gooch p.385
 3. Gooch p.385

factor. 1.

But it was not to be. When the Russian Minister of Finance, Count Witte, was shown the documents by his colleague of the Foreign Office, he exclaimed, "Does not His Majesty know that we have a treaty with France?" 2. That was the objection. Russia could hardly place France in the position of having to choose between abandoning the Dual Alliance and abandoning Alsace Lorraine. The Russian Ambassador to France reported that the Republic would never enter such a group. 3. Thus it was the Dual Alliance itself which prevented completion of an instrument that would have effected its virtual destruction.

Far from merging the two alliances, the fruitless effort may have left them more divergent than they had ever been before. The draft had been presented by Kaiser to Tsar during the "social" hour after dining, and upon a supposedly unofficial occasion. It was thus quite natural that the Russian Ministers, who had felt themselves compelled to make rather vigorous remonstrances, should feel that advantage had been taken of their master. On the other

1. This attempt of the Kaiser is often regarded as an anti-British effort. The Kaiser's own words support this view. (See Gooch p.386) Of course, if it became the controlling element in European politics, it would prevent England from uniting with one power on the continent against the other. There is, of course, nothing in the treaty itself which could demand aggressive action of any sort.
2. Gooch.- p.387 (H. of M. 2.)
3. Gooch.- p.388 (H. of M. 2.)

the paper had actually been signed by both rulers and it was natural that the Kaiser should suspect French aims after he had seemed to be so near the realization of designs which might have been a blessing to the continent and made him an outstanding figure of history. In a letter to the Tsar he remarked,¹ "If your French agreement is like ours, purely defensive, there is no incompatibility between the two."

Toward the end of the war Germany had taken advantage of Russia's troubles to secure a favorable commercial treaty with her. After the conclusion of peace Germany declined to take part in a loan to Russia. Thereafter, relations between the two groups rapidly grew worse.

Not even the momentous Franco-British arrangement of 1904 could compensate at once for the blow dealt the Dual Alliance by the Russo-Japanese War. Russia's humiliation did not end in the necessity of surrendering her claims in Korea and southern Manchuria. The defeat of the enormous European and Asiatic Empire by a power much smaller in population and resources, advertised to the world the inefficiency of the Russian system. France knew, and the world knew that her ally was not what she had appeared to be.

However, Russia's troubles did not end with sacrifices to her rival and loss of prestige. In 1901, Count Witte had written to the Russian Foreign Minister a letter containing the following

1. Gooch ^{H. of M. C.} p. 388

sentences: 1.

"An armed clash with Japan in the near future would be a great disaster for us. I do not doubt that Russia will emerge victorious from the struggle, but the victory will cost us too much and will badly injure the country economically. Furthermore, and this is most important, in the eyes of the Russian people, a war with Japan for the possession of distant Korea will not be justified, and the latent dissatisfaction may render more acute the alarming phenomena of our domestic life, which make themselves felt even in peace time."

Witte's only miscalculation was assumption of victory. If a victorious war would cause disaffection among Russian social elements, what could be expected in case of complete defeat? The war was followed in Russia by a revolution which might have compelled the grant of considerable constitutional liberty, had not other nations financed the Tsar's regime over the crisis. The great loan of 1906 (the greater part of which came from France) was called by Witte the "loan that saved Russia." Korff has more properly stated that it saved Russian autocracy. 2. Those participating in the loan have been defended on the ground that protection against the Triple Alliance demanded it. On the other hand, Korff charges that France might better have made the loan conditional upon the liberalizing of Russian institutions, realizing

1. Memoirs of Count Witte. p.117
2. Korff p.18

that a democratic Russia would be a better ally in the end. 2.

A very important result of the war was the necessary westward orientation of Russian policy. Ousted from Korea and checked in the Far East generally, Russia would naturally spend her energies in developing her interests, or trying to realize her aims farther west. Always interested in expansion, Russia might naturally thereafter, devote herself with renewed interest to her projects in Western Asia, the Straits, or the Balkans. England, Turkey and members of the Triple Alliance might naturally be her great rivals.

The Russo-British Treaty of 1907 eliminated England as a major rival and quite definitely limited Russian activities in Western Asia. A "window upon the open sea" had long been a cherished ambition of Russia. Access to the Pacific had been checked by Japan. Access to the Persian Gulf was cut off by England in 1907 as the treaty located Russia's sphere in Northern Persia. There still remained the ancient favorite, Constantinople. In other words, the war was a blow to the "eastern school" of Russian foreign policy and a triumph for those who, like Isvolsky, favored the concentration of energy in the Occident.

In 1904 the great reconciliation between France and England clarified the colonial situation and removed most of the basis for any French fears of British hostility. The way was thus cleared for both France and Russia to concentrate more attention

upon problems of the European continent. The larger financial connections soon to be established between them (the Great Loan was in 1906) naturally made close cooperation almost inevitable.

FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS.

The Moroccan Episode was the first really bitter dispute between the two alliances. War came within sight and thereafter it was frequently to return within the range of possibility. The Dual Alliance was not free from responsibility as Delcasse undoubtedly blundered in not endeavoring to secure German support before embarking upon his program.¹ On the other hand, no matter what legal and moral justification Germany may have had for insisting upon the European character of the problem, her course was psychologically wrong. The Kaiser's visit to Tangiers, in view of his position and personality, naturally introduced an "alarmist" element in the situation which tended to solidify the opposition.²

In advising the removal of Delcasse, von Donnersmarck undoubtedly said too much.³ It made no difference to history whether Delcasse's dismissal was first suggested from Berlin or Paris, since French public opinion assumed German instigation. A foreign government had intervened to change the personnel of the French cabinet. Delcasse had fallen because he was too able to please Germany. Such was the French interpretation and natural

1. No private understanding with Germany, such as those undertaken with Italy, Spain and England, seems to have been attempted. Millet's "Notre Politique Exterieur" p.227, gives an interesting French criticism.
2. Gooch.- p.354 (H. of M. Q.)
3. Tardieu.- p.183

resentment was aroused. It was one of those incidents which so wound a people's sense of national dignity as to be remembered entirely out of proportion to their political significance. After the controversy had been settled the most anti-German group of French leaders found themselves with much more material for discussion.

In her insistence upon a conference Germany may have sought to test the relative strength of the rival groups. The conference accomplished that purpose in registering the new diplomatic position of the Dual Alliance. To be sure the support given France by Spain, Italy and England was the result of special arrangements, but in the case of Italy, and especially in the case of England, these arrangements were parts of larger understandings which promised to influence national policy long after the Moroccan settlement. In spite of Russia's weakness French diplomacy had participated in the establishment of cordial relations which France's ally was soon to share. France had secured English friendship ^{1.} by sacrificing any ambitions she may have cherished regarding Egypt. She had secured Italian support ^{2.} by promising to return the favor when events should occur at Tripoli. The year 1907 saw English cordiality extended to Russia, ³ when definite agreements were reached regarding interests in Southwestern Asia.

1. Gooch.- p.343

2. Gooch.- p.346

3. B. de Siebert and G.A. Schriener "Entente Diplomacy and the World" p.44

H. of M. E.
H. of M. E.

In 1909, by the Treaty of Raccognigi,¹ Russia had secured a promise of Italian support for her "historic mission"² in return for a promise of support regarding Tripoli. Japan, already in strong alliance with England, made a treaty with Russia in 1907 for the delimitation of "spheres" in the Far East,³ and the two powers concluded extensive agreements both publicly and secretly in 1910.⁴ Italy did not leave the Triple Alliance before the World War but after the renewal of 1902 she was an uncertain factor. Thus may be traced the growth of "offshoots" of the Dual Alliance. The confidence between France and Russia seemed to form the continental center about which a group of more or less related understandings developed. Of this new tendency the grouping of votes at Algeciras seems to have served the Central Powers with the first warning. In closing his discussion of the Moroccan incident, G.P. Gooch remarks, "The process which Germans describe as encirclement, and Englishmen as insurance, had begun."⁵ The entire affair was a bad omen for it must have left a feeling of strong suspicion, although it was obvious that no government desired war.

The time of the occurrence was of particular significance. Russia's recent defeat made her active support of France in case of war almost impossible and valueless if it eventuated. Thus it very

1. Ewart.- "Roots and Causes of the Wars." Vol. I. p. 235
2. The power to use the Straits at Constantinople advantageously for Russian vessels in case of war.
3. de Siebert.- p. 16
4. de Siebert.- p. 17
5. Gooch.- *H. of M.* p. 368

naturally appeared in both Paris and St. Petersburg that Germany sought to take advantage of her neighbor's misfortune.

ISVOLSKY
and
Aehrenthal

Both the great loan and the Moroccan Conference occurred in 1906. That year also witnessed important changes in the incumbency of two foreign offices, Isvolsky being installed at St. Petersburg, and Aehrenthal at Vienna. Both were men of decisive attitude and willingness to shoulder responsibility. In the light of subsequent events, it is doubtful if either selection augured well for peace.

ANNEXATION
of
BOSNIA
and
HERZEGOVINA

In several respects the first Moroccan crisis and that regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina are comparable. In the latter case it was Austria rather than Germany which provoked the resentment of the Dual Alliance by apparently taking advantage of Russia's defeat, while it was Russia this time, rather than France, that was particularly humiliated. Like the case of Delcasse's dismissal, it could make little difference to history where the idea of Aehrenthal's step originated. Curiously enough the suggestion seemed to have come from Isvolsky¹ who, of all people, was most incensed when it was carried into execution. Aehrenthal's action

1. Gooch. ^{H. of M. C.} - p.411

was undoubtedly abrupt, but its relentless character has been greatly exaggerated. The "right" of Austria to proceed from occupation to annexation had been recognized by Russia at different times as in 1881,¹ 1884,² and 1897.³ When Isvolsky offered Russian support for such a project to Aehrenthal, his offer was conditional upon Austrian support of Russia's program at the Straits.⁴ There seems to have been no definite agreement as to the time that the two nations should carry their respective attacks upon Turkish sovereignty into effect. Aehrenthal acted promptly and his part of the bargain was won. Inability to secure British consent left Isvolsky empty handed and with all the bitterness of personal humiliation. The long and tortuous correspondence which finally ended in settlement by exchange of notes was significant from several angles.

First, it showed the position the Dual Alliance had come to have in English foreign policy. At Algeciras, English support of France had been secured by a special agreement relating to that particular subject. In the Bosnian affair, even after Russia herself had virtually surrendered, Sir Edward Grey was very deliberate in coming to a decision as to whether or not he would accept a mere exchange of notes as a satisfactory solution.⁵ To be sure, Grey was sharply criticized by his countrymen for his resolute course, but

1. Pribram,- Vol. I. p.43
2. Pribram,- p.91
3. Pribram,- p.189
4. Gooch,- Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy.
Vol. III. p.402
5. Gooch,- Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy
Vol. III. p.411

he was able to hold his own.

Second, in spite of the very cordial relations existing between London and St. Petersburg, the incident revealed how deep rooted were England's objections to Russian control of the Straits. Although the British Government expressed sympathy for the Russian aim and characterized its veto as only temporary, it would be very natural for Isvolsky to conclude that if England would ever consent in time of general peace she would have consented then. In view of the relations between England and France the English attitude would be an almost insurmountable obstacle to Russian seizure in time of peace.

Third, it revealed no French willingness to go to war in support of Russia's Balkan interests.¹

Fourth, it very nearly, if not quite, convinced high Russian authorities that their European aims could not be accomplished without war. This may seem to be a strong statement but there is an abundance of evidence. Just to quote a few examples: In 1908, the Tsar prophesied to the Serbian Prime Minister that the question raised regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina "will only be solved by war."²

1. To show just how the Alliance stood at the time, we may quote a statement from the French Foreign Minister to the Russian Ambassador: "We shall loyally fulfill the obligations of our alliance---
--But as this creates an extraordinarily serious situation for two countries, neither of which wishes war, I have considered it my duty to seek for means by which this danger may be forestalled."
de Siebert.- p.239.
2. Montegelas.- The case for the Central Powers. p.36

The Russian Ambassador at London in writing to Isvolsky told of his discussion with Grey regarding the German "ultimatum"¹. to Russia and indirectly quoted himself as saying that "everything which I knew about the German step made me firmly believe that the latter represented a method which Russia was not likely to forget."² About the same time the Russian Ambassador at Paris wrote to Isvolsky, "so must the two Western Powers, together with Russia, now pay their attention to the systematic development of their forces in order to be able, once they are in a position not to fear a challenge of the Triple Alliance -and in this case Italy would separate herself from the Triple Alliance- to set up on their part demands which would restore the political balance which has now been displaced in favor of Germany and Austria."³. The same letter expresses the necessity of being "firmly determined not to admit further provocations on the part of the Triple Alliance." Another letter by the same man to Isvolsky, after urgently stressing the need of greater military preparations, says "and finally only in this manner will Russia be able to fulfill that great historic mission to which she has been predestined by Providence;"⁴. and still another communication between the same parties contains a further statement in the same vein, "for historical experience, for example, the latest events, have again proved that world-problems of such a nature can-

1. Gooch.- p.421 Germany had sent a note to Russia regarding a proposed means of settlement. It contained the statement that she expected "Yes or No" in answer. In case of an ambiguous reply she would "let things take their course."
2. de Siebert.- p.265
3. de Siebert.- p.266
4. de Siebert.- p.271

not be solved without resorting to force" ¹ and expresses the hope that measures will be taken, or the urgency of such at least recognized, to enable Russia to fulfill her historic mission and to prevent a world-problem being settled in a manner not in accordance with our interests." ².

Again we may note a letter to Isvolsky sent by the Russian Minister to Serbia and containing advice for the perfection of military strength to prepare "for events which were inevitable."³

Finally, in December, 1909, a secret convention was drafted between Russia and Bulgaria, of which the fifth article stated that "The realization of the high ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkan Peninsula, which are so close to Russia's heart, is only possible after a fortunate issue of the struggle with Germany and Austria-Hungary."⁴.

Fifth, it gave Russia an excuse for intriguing in the Balkans under guise of protecting her small neighbors against Austria. Said Isvolsky to the Serbian Professor Koshietich, "Serbia will be condemned to a hard life until the moment of Austria-Hungary's downfall comes. The annexation has brought that moment nearer, and when it arrives, Russia will raise the Serbian question and solve it."⁵. At the same time the act made fear and distrust of Austria

1. de Siebert p 272
2. de Siebert. p.272
3. Montegelas 40, quoting de Siebert.
4. This article is referred to by Montegelas, Stieve and Gooch. According to Russian sources, the treaty was drafted but not concluded. In any case, it shows the state of Isvolsky's mind. See Gooch, p.424.
5. Montegelas.- p.36

a natural state of mind in the Balkans, while it naturally increased the tendency of South Slavs to look to Russia for protection and accept her advice with favor. The Serbian Foreign Minister remarked to a Vienna journalist "My country feels it almost like physical pain."¹.

Sixth, it left Russia, Isvolsky in particular, deeply resentful. Bosnia and Herzegovina became a kind of Russian Alsace Lorraine. Each member of the Dual Alliance now had a grievance against a member of the Triple Alliance, a grievance which wounded national pride and recalled an incident that at least some persons in high authority could not regard as a settled matter.

Seventh, now, when Russia's activities in the Orient had been restricted to a considerable extent, when she would naturally seek to interest herself further in European matters, the act of Aehrenthal supplied her with both excuse and increased incentive. Since 1897 Russia had Austria had been under treaty obligations to maintain a "hands-off" policy in the Balkans.² Now the act of annexation brought that situation to an abrupt ending. Tardieu comments, in speaking of the Russians, "Being anxious to modify the policy of renunciation which had been imposed upon them by their understanding with Austria, they found in Austria's action a reason

1. Gooch.- Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy.

Vol. III. p.406
2. Pribram.- "Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary" Vol. I. p.184

for the pretext for such modification."¹.

All of these conclusions may, of course, be taken too far. It should not be supposed that after the crisis all Russian officialdom was unalterably opposed to cooperation with Austria, nor that all Balkan officials and rulers hated Austria and loved Russia, but the effects of the act are both real and apparent. The immediate consequence was the formation of the Balkan League under Russian direction.

The Period of Humiliation, beginning with the Russo-Japanese War and ending with the Bosnian crisis, was a series of misfortunes from the point of view of those desiring European peace. During the Asiatic War England had given strong support to Japan, and Germany had rather decidedly favored Russia. On account of her recent rapprochement with England, France's position in the war was a difficult one. Between the war period and the Anglo-Russian settlement it would be very natural for Germany to seek to wean Russia away from her ally. That was a result which the German policy in Morocco, whatever may have been its purpose, did not accomplish, and after 1907 English friendship - now extended to both its members - was certainly an asset and not a liability to the Dual Alliance. In the Moroccan trouble first France and later Germany had preferred diplomatic defeat to war. In the Bosnian crisis, Russia had preferred diplomatic defeat to war. In the former case Austria had voted with Germany, but had shown no unfriendliness to France. ~~is~~

1. Tardieu. France and the Alliances. p.261

In the latter case France had even taken military ^{1.} measures to impress Europe with her loyalty to Russia, but the Russian Ambassador at Paris had written to Isvolsky that French public opinion would regard a war for "a strip of Balkan territory" as a crime.^{2.}

When the period closed the members of the Dual Alliance were more closely united and less friendly to the Central Powers than they had been at its opening.

1. de Siebert and Schreiner.- p. 269.
The Russian Ambassador at Paris reports that orders were "given here to grant no permits for furlough in the Eastern Army Corps, and various troop movements and other measures as preliminaries to the mobilization were carried out.
2. de Siebert + S p. 240

THE LAST YEARS OF PEACE.

In estimating the strength of the Dual Alliance, we must regard it as strictly a relative matter. The Dual Alliance was strong in proportion as it compared favorably with the Triple Alliance. The political history of Europe had come to be little more than a series of exchanges between two groups. So important had the "group" idea become that in 1907 the Dual Alliance without any such intention had been the obstacle to an Anglo-German "rapprochement" while in 1909 negotiations for a general political agreement between London and Berlin failed because of the general alliance system. In 1907 the conversations between the Kaiser and Lord Haldane had appeared promising an agreement between the two empires in the Bagdad Railroad matter. But after the British Government expressed a desire for inviting France and Russia to participate, the German Government declined on the ground that the "Conference would fail and accentuate the differences between her and the other powers." 1.

1. Reported by Haldane. See Gooch, 436. *H. of M. 91*

In 1909 proposals for an agreement were made to Great Britain by Bethmann Hollweg. They included a pledge of neutrality in the event of an attack upon either empire by a third power. The proposal appears innocent, but the alliance system made its acceptance by Great Britain impossible. Under that system a nation could very easily leave the "inception of hostilities" to its ally and thus a real aggressor might be "attacked."¹ Alliances had become the "A-B-C" of European politics.

In spite of all its recent humiliations, the Dual Alliance was in a strong diplomatic position at the close of the year 1909. Both France and Russia enjoyed cordial relations with Great Britain, but London and Berlin had not been able to settle their difficulties, nor were they ever able to make substantial progress in doing so until Europe stood upon the brink of war when there was no time for the achievement. Italy had concluded friendly agreements with France, and Russia while her historic friendship with England increased the general confidence among these four nations. Russia had a strong influence in the Balkans, a situation which would naturally have

1. Gooch ^{H. M. G.} p. 452

its effect upon the Slavic subjects of Austria Hungary. How this strong diplomatic position was utilized depended largely upon the personnel in control of the Dual Alliance during the next few years.

In the fall of 1910 Isvolsky left the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg to occupy the Russian Embassy at Paris. He had already proved to be a man of more ambition than ability. The Sanjak Railway episode already described had made him angry and the Bosnian crisis had not soothed him. Always opposed to courting German favor he could now mingle personal resentment with political belief.

Early in 1912 Raymond Poincare became Prime Minister of France, and also Minister of Foreign Affairs. Early in 1913 he was elected President of the Republic. A member of the French Academy, Poincare was both highly educated and capable. Isvolsky speaks of his "energetic, resolute and unbending character."¹ He certainly possesses to a marked degree the capacity for precise thought and

1. Stieve. Isvolsky and the World War. p.135

expression. Opponents of his policy believe his faculty for legalistic reasoning outweighs his human understanding. A native of Lorraine, he expresses an unmistakable anti-German bias.

In 1913 the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Georges Louis, was recalled. The circumstances of this action have occasioned considerable controversy. ^{1.} Isvolsky had complained of him on the ground that he gave official information in an inaccurate manner and, as Prime Minister, Poincare had brought up in the cabinet the subject of his possible recall. Shortly after his election as President, Poincare made a trip to Russia and soon after this visit Isvolsky reported that "the French Government had decided upon various grounds, and especially on account of his poor health, to recall Georges Louis." ^{2.} Opponents of Poincare and Isvolsky believe the real trouble with Louis was the moderation of his attitude toward the Central Powers. ^{3.} They regard his recall as the

1. The following authors have written of it: Stieve, Montglas, Poincare, Lazare, Fabre-Luce, See also, "Un Livre Noir" II p 341 (foot-note)

2. Stieve. p.136

3. Stieve p 64 136

result of a conspiracy against Louis and against peace. Poincare declares that his own views and those of Louis were entirely in accord.^{1.}

The important diplomatic post thus vacated was given to none other than Delcasse. According to Isvolsky, public opinion in France regarded this man as "a sort of personification of the Alliance."^{2.} He had been a leader in many activities but there was always disagreement concerning the wisdom of some of his policies. Certainly he "loved France with passionate devotion,"^{3.} but the Belgian Minister at Paris reported that the "appointment exploded like a bomb."^{4.} The reason for excitement is obvious; Delcasse was famous as an outstanding anti-German.

While in St. Petersburg Poincare made the acquaintance of M. Sazonoff who had occupied the Russian Foreign Office after Isvolsky's transfer. Compared with Isvolsky, Sazonoff appears somewhat moderate, although the two men held very similar views. After meeting Poincare he expressed unstinted praise of the Frenchman in whom, previously, he had not always felt the greatest confidence.

1. Poincare,- Origins of the War. p.
2. Stieve,- p. 137
3. Gooch,- Article on "Delcasse" Contemporary Review, April, 1923
4. Gooch,- Op cit

Among these four men,- Sazonoff, Poincare, Delcasse and Isvolsky, it is not difficult to find contrasts, but the men were able to work together effectively because of their common possession of conservative views, nationalistic sentiments, and strong belief in the Dual Alliance.

Before the formation of the Dual Alliance, France had loaned large sums of money to Russia. The policy had naturally been continued and the Great Loan of 1906 has been mentioned. But Russia was not the only outlet for French capital. France was a creditor nation whose nationals had large sums invested in various parts of the world. It is important to understand what part the Dual Alliance played in the placing of these funds.

In June, 1910, negotiations were under way for a new French loan to Turkey. Isvolsky (still in the Russian Foreign Office) wrote to the Russian Ambassador at Paris that he must interfere in case the loan should be large enough to extend beyond the expenses of the current Turkish budget. Russia would be concerned if Turkey should have a surplus at her disposal. "France has an interest in our military superiority over Turkey. Every reinforcement of Turkey's military position, especially on the Caucasian

frontier, necessitates corresponding counter-measures on our part; these would necessarily also have an influence on our western frontier as well." 1. In other words, France must not loan money to Turkey which Turkey could use for military preparations that would divert Russian military energy from the German and Austrian frontiers.

Isvolsky urges that the situation be met in France by making the loan conditional upon an agreement "restricting Turkey's future military growth." 2. In reply the ambassador declares France to be "firmly resolved to use the loan to secure guaranties from Turkey which will satisfy France, England and Russia." 3. "I have the impression," he goes on, "that Pichon (French Foreign Minister) has been greatly alarmed by your reflections." About a week later he writes again, - "He (Pichon) appeared to me to be chiefly disturbed by your suggestion that the reinforcement of the Turkish troops on the Persian and Caucasian frontiers would result in an immediate reduction of our military strength on the west boundary of Russia."

1. de Siebert & Schriener, "Entente diplomacy and the world" p.298 and following.
2. de Siebert & Schriener, p 299
- 3.

France decided to "use the loan to demand tangible political concessions from Turkey." ^{1.} Both the Russian and French Ambassadors at Constantinople protested ^{2.} against the French terms on the ground that they would encourage Turkey to seek money in Berlin. Such a procedure might naturally increase German influence in Turkey. Thus do we see the degree to which the existence of the Dual Alliance was influencing international finance.

The Oriental interests of France and Russia conflicted at times, but the Alliance was too strong to permit a change in European policy because of divergent interests in the Far East. France's concern about affairs in China was because of financial investments, while Russia, like Japan, had extensive political ambitions there as well as financial interests. France was usually willing to be of any possible service to her ally and opposed to some extent ^{3.} the "Open Door" policy of the United States, because it was not pleasing to Russia. ^{4.}

1. de Siebert & Schreiner p.300
2. de Siebert & Schreiner p 301, 302
3. de Siebert & Schreiner p 5, 15, 22
4. Possibly, also, because of the opportunity it would give to German Commerce.

Early in 1910 the new American Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Mr. Rockhill, urged cooperation in Manchuria upon the basis of the "Open Door" principle and of Chinese independence. He developed a plan which he termed "commercial neutralization" of Manchuria. Russia opposed the policy and France considered it "to be impracticable." 1.

In connection with an American proposal for a fifty million dollar loan to China (November, 1910) the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at London expresses to Sazonoff the opinion (or pretended opinion) that America's purpose is "the penetration of Manchuria." Writing after a talk with his French colleague, he affirms that "The French Government does not deem it possible financially to support an enterprise which is directed against Russia." 2

In 1911 French capitalists entered a syndicate with capitalists of America, England and Germany for operations in China, where it was to assist in the maintenance of the "Open Door" policy. Russia refused to join it and tried to persuade France to withdraw, but was unsuccessful. France urged Russia to join, arguing that her interests would be supported by the

1. de Seibert and Schreiner p.15
2. de Seibert and Schreiner p.15

votes of France and Japan and frequently by the vote of England. Sazonoff replied that "Russia would probably be in solidarity only with the French group." Franco-Russian "solidarity" was thus assumed by both governments. 1.

In 1911 the City of Budapest obtained a loan in France. French financiers had previously invested sums in Hungarian undertakings and municipal loans did not usually require the consent of the government. Nevertheless, Isvolsky protested "every loan granted to Austria Hungary, or even to Hungary" he told M. Cruppi, the Foreign Minister, "likewise weakens the position of Russia and in consequence that of the Dual Alliance." Cruppi replied, among other things, "I am very glad that you have touched on this question and have given me arguments of which I shall make use at the proper time." 2.

Late in 1911, Isvolsky reports his instigation of a newspaper campaign against a "proposed Austrian loan." 3. In May, 1914, the Chief of the Russian Secret Police in France states that "in consequence of political events Austria has during recent

1. deSiebert and Schreiner
2. deSiebert and Schreiner
3. Stieve

p.36
pp.310-311
p.46

years had no access to the Paris Market." 1. Farther on in the same memorial he writes "when for example the Austrian banks, with a view to eventual participation, applied the other day to the French group which is examining the question of the internationalization of the Eastern Railway in Serbia, it sufficed for the Russian representative to declare that the Russian group would not participate in such a combination, to induce the French to give the Austrians a negative answer." 2.

In 1911, while the Morocco negotiations were in progress, Isvolsky reports: "M. Klotz, the Minister of Finance, declared to me that the French Government would under no circumstances agree to Germany's compensation taking the form of the admission of German State securities to quotation on the Paris Bourse." 3.

Thus, anywhere and everywhere, France and Russia pursued the policy that capital under their control must not be diverted into any channels in which it could increase the strength of the Central Powers, or divert any of Russia's military energy from her western frontier.

1. de Siebert and Schreiner p.312
2. de Siebert and Schreiner p.313
3. Stieve p.34

Of a somewhat different nature but interesting in this connection are a few events connected with the Persian situation before the appointment of Mr. Shuster. Early in 1910 a controversy occurred over the appointment of French financial officials for the Persian administration. Persia had been divided into "spheres" of commercial interest by England and Russia. A Frenchman by the name of Bizot was the general financial adviser of the Persian administration. The country needed money and the French government permitted the quotation of a loan upon the Paris bourse after an agreement with Russia and England for the appointment of seven Frenchmen to assist Bizot. 1.

It was natural that Bizot should prefer working with his own countrymen and that France should prefer to have French control where French capital was invested. It was also equally natural that Germany, with commercial interests in Persia, should object to having control of affairs so completely in the hands of France and Russia and their mutual friend, England. It was decided to secure the appointment of men from "neutral" nations as financial advisers. Poincare has been reported as having once declared in the French Chamber that the "Franco-Russian Alliance, which had been con-

1. de Siebert + Schreiner p 46

secretated by positive agreements and by the experiences that time had brought, was being applied at every point of the globe to the benefit of both countries." 1.

Unless it might be for the last six words, there is nothing in the sentence with which any one can disagree.

It is commonly known that during the years immediately preceeding the World War, considerable sums of Russian money were spent in bribing the French press. During the Bosnian crisis, the Russian Ambassador in Paris had reported that French public opinion would condemn a European war arising out of an issue in the Balkans. 2. It is interesting to note how, under Isvolsky's leadership, steps were taken to influence that public opinion in a manner favorable to Russian ambitions.

In August, 1911, Isvolsky requests his government for "adequate material means of influencing the Press" and states that it would be of the "utmost service to have a permanent and reliable means of giving the desired direction to the most important organ here, which are almost only accessible to 'clinking' arguments." 3. In the fall of the same

1. de Siebert and Schreiner
2. de Siebert & Schreiner
3. Stieve

p.73
p 240, 241
p.34

year he repeats his request, commenting that "it is very important to have a good 'press' here. Unfortunately I am still deprived of the principal weapon for assuring this." 1.

In November, 1912, he reports, "Summary of my discussion with Poincare and our ambassador. Both are of the opinion that payments to the Press should be postponed, but consider it desirable to have ready a credit of 300,000 francs for the purpose of immediate intervention when embarked on at a later date. That is reasonable and I agreed to transmit the proposal to Your Excellency. At our request, Poincare will sketch with Lenoir tomorrow the plan of the organization of this service when started." 2.

An elaborate plan was worked out and put into effect by which Russian funds were used to influence the French press under the direction of Poincare and Klotz who, of course, understood the forces controlling the French Press in a way that the Russians could not. During the period of the Balkan wars Isvolsky writes, "Since the beginning of the Balkan crisis, I have taken the greatest pains to secure the support of the most influential of the French papers from our point of view.

1. Stieve p.41
2. Stieve p.117

You must admit that I have had considerable success." 1.

If during the Balkan crisis Isvolsky was willing that the French Prime Minister should supervise the distribution of Russian funds among French papers, he must certainly have had great confidence in that Prime Minister, to say nothing of later evidence. These facts, even though Poincare was opposed to the terms of the Balkan League and -at first- to the Balkan War, might well cause us to wonder how far the new President could have shared the sentiments of his countrymen who, in the Bosnian crisis would have considered a war for a strip of territory in the Balkans to be a crime.

POLITICAL EVENTS BEFORE THE BALKAN WARS.

Toward the end of 1910 a sensible understanding concerning Persia was concluded between Germany and Russia at Potsdam.¹ It should have contributed in some measure to improve international confidence and the sense of security. There is little evidence, however, of improvement. On the contrary, the most striking result seems to have been a kind of public nervousness in France regarding Russian foreign policy,² Germany and Russia, it seems, could not reach a friendly understanding without arousing protests in French papers, a debate in the French Parliament and an appeal from the Russian Ambassador at Paris to his government that he be informed of any future conversations with Berlin.³ This situation does not show that any one desired war but it suggests an unhealthy political atmosphere. Europe had taken some long steps since the time that Russia, Germany, and France, only fifteen years earlier, had intervened together to bring pressure upon Japan in connection with the Shimonoseki Treaty or since - even later - Russia and France had requested Germany to join them in mediation during the Boer War. What had produced so great a change in so short a time?

The knowledge of England's close sympathy and likely cooperation together with the Japanese understandings made the

1. Stieve p 20
2. Stieve p 20
3. Stieve p 21

sentiments of rivalry and unfriendliness on the part of the Dual Alliance concentrated in one direction,-- the Central Powers. France and Russia knew exactly who their opponents were and had little, if any, need to fear complications with other powers. Then such events as the Algeciras Congress and the Bosnian Crisis would naturally introduce elements of lingering bitterness and sensational expectancy. Distrust was the order of the day.

The Act of Algeciras had not settled the Moroccan trouble and neither did the pact of 1909. Franco-German relations did not admit of easy settlement although in form they do not appear to have been worse than Franco-British relations of a few years earlier. The great difference lay in the world situation. In her relations with Germany, France had a position of newly acquired strength as had Russia in her relations with Austria. This new situation was hard for Germany and Austria to accept.¹ Those not accustomed to playing a retreat found conditions wounding to their pride as well as damaging to their interests. Such a situation confronted the Dual Alliance with a series of periodic crises. The last crisis of this sort before the fatal one was "The Panther's Spring" at Agadir.²

Persons who see in Isvolsky the evil genius of modern history may easily interpret his apparent concern for peace

1. Hayes History of Modern Europe p 704
 2. Gooch *et al.* p 470

in 1911 as fear of a Franco-German war which might settle the question of Alsace Lorraine without touching the question of the Straits.¹ They may be correct but it is difficult to understand how Russia could have adopted a much less reproachable course than to leave the discussions to France and Germany as, for the greater part, she did do.

Of course throughout the long period there was no question of Russia's loyalty in case she should be needed. After the expedition to Fez the Russian Ambassador to Germany was instructed to assert at Berlin "that the Tsar's Government regarded France's action as entirely unobjectionable." ¹ Isvolsky was instructed to remind France of the "friendly Russian intervention at Berlin"² and to express confidence that Russia might receive a similar favor should occasion arise. Diplomatic support of an ally was indeed entirely a matter of course. International relations were such that a nation could not incur the slightest risk of losing its ally. An Ally's action must always be "unobjectionable".

Toward the end of October, 1911, settlement seemed to have been finally reached when Germany raised the question of French preemption of the Congo. Russia expressed the view that "any change of sovereignty in the Conventional Basin must be discussed by all the signatories of the Berlin Act."³

1. Stieve p 33
2. Stieve p 36
3. Gooch H. of M. p 482

At one point in the tedious negotiations, Grey said to Beⁿckendorff, - the Russian Ambassador at London, "Much will depend in Berlin on its view of Russia's attitude. What would you do in case of complications?" "There is the Alliance" was Beⁿckendorff's reply.¹

The final settlement was a triumph for France but not bearly so satisfying to Germany. The Dual Alliance was strong but its strength ws becoming a danger. How long could negotiations or conferences that promised to end in victories for the Entente be tolerated by German opinion? However, France had been opposed to a war over Balkan territory in the Bosnian crisis and now Russia had been opposed to a war over Moroccan territory. So long as those attitudes could be maintained there were still possibilities of improvement. Finally, if any thing further was needed to do so, the experience threw light on England's relation to the Dual Alliance, or at least to France. Even if we should regard Lloyd George's Mansion House speech² as something of an accident in the impression it created, we could not escape the realization that in this case England showed less restraint than Russia and we might at least suspect that the great naval power was in fact, if not in form, a member of the Alliance itself.

1. Gooch. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. Vol. III, p 411.

2. Lloyd George had declared that the maintenance of peace at the expense of sacrificing England's international position would be an intolerable humiliation for a great country. The statement was given a strident leader in the "Times".

it appears likely that ⁱⁿ both Germany and England efforts for improvement were sincerely made during the Haldane Mission and thereafter. Whether France played any real part in bringing about the failure of these negotiations is not certain. According to Isvolsky, "Poincare expressed himself most emphatically against such an undertaking." ^{1.} Of course limitations in the German Navy would enable Germany to increase her land preparations if the German Government cared to spend her released energies in that way. It is not certain that under the circumstances France was especially to be blamed but the event shows how difficult any attempts at improvement had been made by the Alliance and Entente systems. The heart of the Entente was the same as the heart of the Dual Alliance. Both centered in the land defenses about Germany and Austria. Things had certainly reached a bad state when England could not sign an agreement ^{for} ~~of~~ neutrality "if war is forced on Germany."

The war in Tripoli strengthened the Dual Alliance by weakening the Triple Alliance. Obviously Germany could not approve Italy's action in view of the relations the empire maintained with Turkey.

The desire to control the Straits runs like a red thread through Russian history. That desire had led Isvolsky to the advances that prompted the Bosnian trouble. Then Russia had

1. Montgelas p. 50
 2. Stieve op.cit. p. 78

asked the right for all nations bordering upon the Black Sea to send war vessels through the Straits in both directions in time of war or peace. The only limitation would be that not more than three vessels of the same Power should be en route at once. Grey replied that such a privilege must be only with Turkey's consent and given alike to all nations.¹ He would not consent to the Black Sea becoming a Russian lake. There was thus a fundamental divergence between London and St. Petersburg, and the divergence had not disappeared when, in 1911, Russia offered to guarantee Constantinople as the price of Turkey's consent. The T Carykoff effort temporarily lessened the solidity of the Alliance by placing France in the position of having to choose between Russia and England. Her promise merely to exchange views "if fresh circumstances should make it necessary, to examine the question of the Straits",² amounted to a refusal to support her ally and prevented any possibility of success in the attempt. This was before the advent of Poincare in the center of French politics. But there were other and far more dangerous ways of trying to secure the Straits.

1. Montegelas p. 89,90
2. Montegelas p. 91

In August, 1912, Poincare visited Russia and discussed matters very thoroughly with Sazonoff.¹ Both men expressed satisfaction with the Franco-Russian Naval Convention which we have previously noted. Referring to the protocol drafted at the last conference of military experts (as provided by the military convention) Poincare attached high importance to the suggestion that Russia improve her railway connections in the western frontier by means of constructing double tracks in specified cases. Sazonoff replied that he knew of those discussions and that they would receive the fullest possible consideration.

After remarking upon the particularly intimate character of the Franco-Russian relations, Poincare confided that the military and naval chiefs of staff of France and England were in close contact and continuously exchanging information "with entire freedom concerning everything which can interest them."¹ He stated that England had declared verbally her readiness to aid France with her land and naval forces in case of an attack by Germany, and had promised to send 100,000 men to the Belgian frontier "to repulse the invasion of the German army."¹ Poincare implored his host to preserve the most absolute secrecy concerning these facts, - not to let even the English know he was in possession of them.

In connection with the naval aid which England and France had the intention of lending each other, Poincare raised the ques-

1. Sazonoff.- Report of the conversations to the Zsar.
Un Livre Noir Vol.II. p.338 and following.

tion of possible Anglo-Russian cooperation on the sea. By the Franco-Russian naval convention the French had pledged themselves to divert the Austrian fleet in the Mediterranean. Poincare urged that the British fleet should be able to render Russia a similar service in the Baltic Sea, and suggested that Sazonoff make use of his coming visit to England to make the necessary arrangements with "the personalities directing English policy." (*dine Nov.*)

According to Joffre, British military support of France "had been worked out in every detail."¹ The concentration of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, too, would naturally extend the moral responsibilities of England to support France. In February, 1913, Poincare remarked to Isvolsky that the nature of English assurances allowed the French government "in the existing political conjunctures, to count upon the armed support of England in case of a conflict with Germany."²

The Bourse Gazette for March, 1914, contained an article which Schmitt states was inspired by the Russian War Minister.³ It makes these interesting statements regarding Russian preparations: "Russia wishes for peace but is prepared for war. The army is not only large but excellently equipped.--- Russia is ready."

1. Joffre is indirectly quoted as making this statement by B.E. Schmitt, in the "American Historical Review" for April, 1924.
2. Schmitt.- "American Historical Review" April, 1924.
3. Schmitt. op.cit. p.470

During the days of correspondence relating to the Sarajevo crime, the Russian Ambassador at Paris made the following report: "Our Military Attache reports fully about preparatory military proceedings. The spirit in circles of the army and chiefs of command is very high."¹.

One measure remained to be taken. Sazonoff, acting upon Poincare's advice, opened the subject of a Russo-British naval understanding during a conversation with Grey.² The latter was sympathetic but stated that the possibility of a German seizure of Denmark would oblige England to confine naval operations in that vicinity to the North Sea. No agreement was concluded, but in a conversation on naval possibilities between Sazonoff and George V. the latter is reported to have exclaimed, - "We shall sink every German merchant ship we shall get hold off."³ Still Russia does not seem to have been fully satisfied. In the Spring of 1914 the British Foreign Minister visited France and was approached, this time by the French authorities, regarding the possibility of an Anglo-Russian naval convention.⁴ Again he appeared sympathetic and this time virtually agreed although he explained that he must first confer with Asquith and other members

1. Baron G. von Romberg.- "Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book." p.46
2. ~~Le~~ Livre Noire.- Vol. II. p.347
3. ~~Le~~ Livre Noire.- II. p.347 -This was in 1912.
4. ~~Le~~ Livre Noire.- pp. 260-261
Bethman Hollweg gives an interesting comment in "Reflections on the World War" pp.63-64.

of the cabinet. There is no evidence of conclusion of the treaty, but Grey's attitude must have been very reassuring to Russia.

In 1913 France reintroduced the three-year period of service. At the same time the age limit for recruits was lowered from twenty ~~one~~ to twenty ~~one~~ and raised from forty-five to forty-eight.¹ In 1914 measures were passed for the reorganization of the reserves. Montégelas² quotes the French military expert, General Buat, as declaring "It is not only incorrect to say that Germany made the greatest possible total effort of which she was capable in 1914, but it is absolutely false to assert that Germany had drawn as much on her reserves as France."³

In 1913 Russia increased the number of men to be enlisted yearly to 580,000.⁴ The period of service was lengthened by six months. The subject of the military preparations of the two alliances is in itself a field for thorough investigation. Figures must be handled with great care as different nations may not include the same items in their military budgets. Then, the grouping of powers itself would be a problem in some cases. A comparison of the armaments of France and Russia on the one side with those of Germany, Austria and Italy on the other would mean little or nothing. Should Turkey's preparations be added to those of Germany and Austria, and should England be definitely grouped with France and Russia? Should Japan

1. Montégelas.- p.105

2. Montégelas.- p.107

3. General Buat was the director of the second section of the French General Staff during the war. He accompanied Briand to the Washington conference in 1922.

4. Montégelas.- p.105

(who had a secret treaty with Russia) be counted? And what should be done with Italy, Roumania, and Bulgaria -countries which were theoretically grouped with one side and fought with the other? It suffices to note that during the period of the Balkan Wars, the members of the Dual Alliance, like their rivals, made exceptional military efforts.

Mental, as well as physical, preparedness must be taken into account. In April, 1912, Poincare remarked to the French Ambassador at Berlin, "They (the Germans) seem to be pertinaciously endeavoring to bring about a rapprochement which would beally be impossible unless the former status were completely restored. If we entertained such proposals we should fall out with England and Russia."¹. In September, Isvolsky reports a long conversation with Poincare in which the latter² indirectly quoted as saying "that well informed and responsible personalities are very optimistic in their judgment of the prospects of Russia and France in the event of a general conflict."².

In November of the same year, Isvolsky explains what he regards as a new French attitude. "Hitherto, France has merely declared to us that local happenings, virtually of purely Balkan interest, could only occasion diplomatic steps on her part and no sort of active intervention. Now, however, she seems to realize that Austrian territorial conquests would affect the general balance of power."³.

1. Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete Sur les Faits de la Guerre.
2. Stieve. p.106
3. Stieve. p.111

In a November report, Isvolsky employs an interesting manner of complimenting Poincare: "Poincare remarked that opinion in France is strongly pro-peace and that he has always to keep this in mind. We are, it seems to me, all the more indebted to him for his fixed resolve most loyally to fulfill his duties as an ally in case of need."¹ And in January, 1913, Isvolsky quotes Poincare as saying, "it is of the greatest importance to the French government to have the opportunity of preparing French public opinion in advance for participating in any war which might break out over the Balkans."²

On the next day he gives another account of conversations with French authorities: "The French Government admits quite coolly and with its eyes open that it is possible that the ultimate issue of the present complications may involve it in the necessity of taking part in a general war."³

After the outbreak of the World War, Isvolsky sends to his government a telegram which leads us to believe that the two governments had discussed war aims in 1913: "Delcasse then referred to the negotiations which took place in St. Petersburg in 1913, and earnestly asked me to draw your attention to the fact that the demands and the aspirations of France remain unaltered, with the addition only of the necessary destruction of the political and economic power of Germany."⁴

Many other quotations from Isvolsky might be given but there

1.	Stieve	p.118
2.	Stieve	p.134
3.	Stieve	p.134
4.	Stieve	p.141

can be no necessity of them. To turn, briefly, to others, we note a report of Beuckendorff (Russian Ambassador to England) made after an Ambassadors' Conference in London. After recalling Cambon's conversations with him and connecting with them "Poincare's attitude" he concludes "I get the feeling, almost the conviction, that —France¹.— not to say wants war, at all events would see it without great regret."²

In the Spring of 1913, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, in a confidential report to his government, expressed the opinion that "The tension, it would appear, will become such, that, at length, war will become inevitable. But no matter how terrible may be the consequences of a general conflict, the advantages, in my opinion, would be on our side."³

Finally, a few days before the Sarejevo murder, the French Ambassador to Russia remarked to Premier Viviani, "I think we are on the verge of war, and that we must prepare for it."⁴

These quotations show that in the years immediately preceding the world crisis there were men very high in authority in the Dual Alliance who thought in terms of war. If they did not desire war, if they did not regard it as inevitable, they at least considered it very likely. It need hardly be said that these sentiments were not confined to the Dual Alliance.

The success of the Italian project in Tripoli effected the territorial aggrandisement of a member of the Triple Alliance. But

1. He means, of course, the French government. Beuckendorff was not in touch with French public opinion.
2. Stieve.— p.151
3. de Siebert and Schreiner.— p.672
4. Montgelas.— p.108

the fact could hardly be regarded as of any benefit to Austria and Germany, while the fact that the Germans could do nothing to help Turkey was a blow to the prestige of the Central Powers. During his visit to Russia in 1912, Poincare discussed the Italian question with Sazonoff.¹ Both men agreed that the proper policy was the maintenance of friendly and very confidential relations with Italy while that country should remain a "dead weight" in the Triple Alliance. Sazonoff inquired as to the possibility of the flotation of a Turkish loan upon the Paris Bourse before the termination of the Tripolitan War. Poincare replied "without hesitation" in the negative.

In the von Sanders incident the eastern member of the Dual Alliance failed to get all it had desired, although Sazonoff certainly tried. The negotiations may have left him embittered somewhat as Isvolsky had been affected by the Bosnian crisis.² Had not the general relations become too poisoned the English friendship for France and Russia might have proved a real influence for peace in this case. It may have postponed war but it did not prevent it. French support of Russia could hardly have been greater. Isvolsky transmitted to Sazonoff something quite like a "blank check" in the following form: "M. Doumergue assures M. Isvolsky that the Government of the Republic is firmly determined to join in all actions which the Russian Government has undertaken at Constantinople in connection with the mission of the German General Sanders."³

1. Un Livre Noir. Vol. II. p.340
2. Gooch.- *H.M.C.* p.519
3. de Siebert and Schreiner.- p.697

The French reply to the Tcharykoff proposal had been given before the "regime" of Poincare began. Russia did not receive the unqualified support of England in either the Tcharykoff attempt or the opposition to Sanders. But it is very interesting to compare the French attitudes in the different cases. The vital point to take into account is that in 1913 France was willing to give Russia almost unqualified support in a matter concerning the Straits.

Between the Bosnian crisis and 1912 the Balkan League had been formed under Russian leadership. It is very true that Poincare objected to the terms of the alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria, seeing in them a "character more aggressive than defensive."¹ But after the Balkan Wars had begun and the Balkan States had proved their fighting abilities, the Balance of Power was obviously shifting further in favor of the Dual Alliance. The weakening of Turkey and the strengthening of Russia's southern friends could only help Russia and France. Throughout the period France gave her ally full support. In April, 1913, Isvolsky sent to his government a telegram relative to a naval demonstration in the Balkan neighborhood. It closed with this sentence: "At the same time, Poincare assured me that the French Government always appreciates the complete union with us and that, on that account, if there were on our part the slightest objection to the said measure, it would immediately renounce it."²

1. Un Livre Noir. Vol. II. p. 342

2. Un Livre Noir. Vol. II. p. 66

The period of the Balkan Wars was the last stage in the development of strength within the Dual Alliance. It had advertised and increased the weakness of Turkey, a friend of Germany. It increased the power of energetic fighting peoples who were friendly to Russia. When the Dual Alliance had first been formed it had contributed toward the establishment of an equilibrium in European relations. So far as there was any advantage in the earlier years, that advantage was probably upon the side of the Triple Alliance. But in 1914 the advantage had shifted in the other direction. The Triple Alliance with the asset of a friendly Turkey, and the liabilities of an uncertain Italy, and a heterogeneous Austria-Hungary was pitted against the Dual Alliance with the assets of a cordial England, a friendly Japan and the dominant influence in the Balkans. The spirit between the two groups had entirely changed. To quote a witticism of Winston Churchill, in the opening years of the twentieth century the alliances were "side by side," not "face to face." In 1914 they were certainly "face to face." In its earlier years the Dual Alliance had been defensive and generally pacific in character. Because of the pressure of historical events and of the characters of some men in high office, the year 1914 found the Dual Alliance less pacific and less purely defensive than it had once been.

Bethman-Hollweg admits that not long before the World War, Sazonoff had proposed to a German financier that Germany abandon Austria and Russia abandon France, but he believes that even if Sazonoff meant the suggestion seriously at the time, he greatly overestimated the possibilities of change.¹

1. Bethman Hallweg. "Reflections on the world war."

He describes Russia's position as "bound to a France that could not turn its eyes from that void in the Vosges by an alliance that had become ingrained in the popular instincts, that was almost annually reinforced by financial bonds, and that had guided Russian activities for whole decades."

Concerning French support of Russia, it suffices to quote one sentence of a communication sent by Isvolsky to his government during the period after the assassination and before the World War: "As far as French solidarity with us is concerned, this is considered as self evident and is not even discussed."¹

1. Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book. p.44